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Addressing Judicial Activism in the




In recent years, the Indian Supreme Court has invited significant
attention for the important position it has come to occupy within the
nation's politics. Commentary on the working of the Court has been
varied, with some scholars voicing strong opposition to the judiciary's
rise,2 while others highlighting its role in the achievement of social
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All views expressed are my own. I wish to thank the Hon. Justice H.S. Bedi (Supreme
Court of India), Paul Craig (University of Oxford), Madhava Menon (Commission
on Centre-State Relations, Government of India), Sudhir Krishnaswamy (National
Law School of India University) and Ananth Padmanabhan (Advocate, High Court
of Judicature at Madras) for their useful comments and suggestions. I am particularly
grateful to Arun Kumar Thiruvengadam (National University of Singapore) for his
comprehensive review of an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., Pratap Bhanu Metha, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J.
DEMOCRACY 70, 72, 79 (2007) ("[T]he Court has helped itself to so much power...
without explaining from whence its own authority is supposed to come . . . [i]n
decision after decision, be it the authority to review constitutional amendments or the
mode of appointing judges, the Supreme Court has created its own powers.")
(hereinafter, METHA, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty); Pratap Bhanu Metha, With
Due Respect, Lordships, INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.indian express.com/story/25375.html ("[Tihe evidence of judicial
overreach is now too overwhelming to be ignored. Courts are doing things because
they can, not because they are right, legal or just."); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, India's
Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty, in PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA:
PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN 158, 159 (Pratap Bhanu Mehta & Devesh Kapur eds.,
2005) (referring to the Indian judiciary as an "institution of governance").
2. See, e.g., Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure
Doctrine, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 107, 108 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000)
(observing that the basic structure doctrine has meant that "unelected judges have
assumed vast political power not given to them by the Constitution") (hereinafter,
Ramachandran, Basic Structure Doctrine).
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justice.3 The Court's experiment with public interest litigation in
particular has fascinated many, both in India and around the world.!
Similarly, contemporary debates on the justiciability of socio-
economic rights seem incomplete without reference to Court's
experience in the adjudication of these rights The usage of term
"judicial activism" has become commonplace in evaluations of the
Court's functioning, and the Court has acquired the reputation of
being "one of the world's most powerful judicial bodies" whose
judges "play an unprecedented governing role.",6 The discourse on
India's "inventive and activist"7 judiciary has evolved considerably
3. See, e.g., Vijayashri Sripati, Human Rights in India - Fifty Years after
Independence, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93, 136 (1997) ("The Indian Constitution
explicitly lacks much of what is identified with modern Indian Constitutionalism; it is
the Supreme Court's contribution that has established the impressive array of
Fundamental Rights as we know them today. I can, therefore, think of no good
reason why the Supreme Court should forsake its activism and revert to a restrained
and passive role in the future."); see also Jeremy Cooper, Poverty and Constitutional
Justice: The Indian Experience, 44 MERCER L. REV. 611, 616-34 (1993) (discussing
strategies the Court has adopted to achieve social justice).
4. See, e.g., P. P. Craig & S. L. Deshpande, Rights, Autonomy and Process:
Public Interest Litigation in India, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 356 (1989) (examining
how public interest litigation has led to a relationship between Parts III and IV of the
Indian Constitution); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation
in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989) (discussing the
limitations of public interest litigation as an instrument for social transformation); G.
L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions, 40
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 66 (1991); Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of
India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 57
(1994); Parmanand Singh, Protection of Human Rights through Public Interest
Litigation in India, 42 J. INDIAN L. INST. 263 (2000) (surveying the role of public
interest litigation in protecting human rights); Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar,
Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE
159 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); P.P. Rao, Public Interest Litigations: Practice,
Procedure and Precautions - Some Perceptions, 31 INDIAN BAR REV. 25 (2004); see
generally Christine M. Forster & Vedna Jivan, Public Interest Litigation and Human
Rights Implementation: The Indian and Australian Experience, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. 1
(2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol3/issl/art6.
5. See, e.g., CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION:
GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENT LIFE 180-81 (2000); Navish Jheelan, The
Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights, 12 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 146 (2007);
Jayna Kothari, Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade, in
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS 171 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross eds., 2007);
SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE
DUTIES 124-49 (2008) (examining the Indian experience with socio-economic rights
adjudication and analyzing the phenomenon of public interest litigation) (hereinafter,
FREDMAN, Human Rights Transformed).
6. METHA, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 70, 79.
7. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor": Access to
L[Vol. 32:1
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over the past decade. Recent writings have begun to question the
impact of judicial activism, and whether courts can really bring about
social transformation.8 Scholars have inquired into the reasons for
the judiciary's rise in India, and there has been a growing emphasis on
the contributing influence of the failure of India's representative
institutions.9
Yet, despite the wide-ranging body of literature examining the
phenomenon of judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court,0 the
discourse in this area has, for the most part, not effectively engaged
Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 789 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Armin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case:
The Supreme Court of India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L.
223 (2003) (analyzing how the Delhi Pollution Case has not resulted in providing
long-term environmental protection); Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest
Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of Access, Participation, Equity,
Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2007) (examining the limitations
that arise and concerns that emerge by studying two major public interest
environmental cases of the Indian Supreme Court); see generally GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(2nd ed. 2008) (discussing limitations of judicial power in general).
9. See, e.g., ARUN SHOURIE, COURTS AND THEIR JUDGMENTS 13 (2001) ("As
other institutions have neglected their duties, courts have had to step in."); see also
generally ARUN SHOURIE, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM (2007) (suggesting the
creation of a strong President and a weak Parliament); Nick Robinson, Expanding
Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. (2008) (forthcoming); Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The
Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability, United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development: Democracy, Governance and Human Rights
Programme Paper - No. 23 (Jan. 2006), available at http://casi.ssc.
upenn.edu/about/Indian%20Parliament%20&%20Accountability.pdf (discussing the
institutional decline of the Indian Parliament). For an excellent recent analysis of the
problems with parliamentary debates in India (though specifically in the context of
reservations), see RAJEEV DHAVAN, RESERVED: How PARLIAMENT DEBATED
RESERVATIONS - 1995 TO 2007 25 (2008) ("[T]here is a lot missing in the
parliamentary debates and only shows up Parliament's lack of rigour [sic] in respect
of its primary task of making laws.").
10. See, e.g., Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, Judicial Activism - A Democratic
Demand, 31 INDIAN BAR REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that the Indian judiciary has a
crucial role to play in safeguarding fundamental rights and furthering social justice);
Justice M.N. Rao, Judicial Activism, Sup. Cr. CASES J. 1 (1997); S.P. Sathe, Judicial
Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 29 (2001) (hereinafter
SATHE, Judicial Activism); S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING
BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS (2d ed. 2003) (hereinafter, SATHE, Transgressing
Borders); Shubhankar Dam, Lawmaking Beyond Lawmakers: Understanding the
Little Right And The Great Wrong (Analyzing the Legitimacy of the Nature of Judicial
Lawmaking in India's Constitutional Dynamic), 13 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109
(2005) (examining the nature of judicial decision-making in India and the legitimacy
concerns that arise).
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with the meaning of the term "judicial activism." At first blush, this
question appears to be an extremely fundamental one. While
commentators (on the Indian Supreme Court) often ask whether or
not a decision is activist, they almost never inquire into what makes a
decision activist, or whether decisions ought to be considered activist
in certain specific ways. Discussions on the activist nature of a
decision usually begin, and end, with whether the decision appears to
transcend judicial boundaries and enter the space of the executive or
legislature. However, judicial activism is unfortunately not such a
simple phenomenon. Its multifaceted nature suggests that a range of
factors ought to be considered before a decision is branded as an
instance of activism. Consequently, decisions may well be activist by
some parameters but restrained by others. We can only arrive at such
a sophisticated understanding of decisions if we can somehow
"measure" judicial activism.
The "measuring" of judicial activism may not be a feature
ordinarily associated with the study of how courts function, and the
usage of the term may to some seem surprising, or even misleading.
However, a recent model proposed by Cohn and Kremnitzer suggests
a methodology by which such measuring may be made possible."
Cohn and Kremnitzer posit three functions of a judiciary: the
traditional function of dispute resolution, the function to participate
in the public sphere, and the duty to uphold certain core values.
Building on previous models of activism, Cohn and Kremnitzer
develop a category of parameters with respect to the performance of
each function. Developing a comprehensive model with seventeen
parameters, Cohn and Kremnitzer provide us with the tools using
which we may attempt to "measure" judicial activism.
This paper examines how the Cohn-Kremnitzer model can be
utilized in evolving the current discourse on judicial activism in the
Indian Supreme Court. The Cohn-Kremnitzer model can contribute
significantly to enhancing the narrative on the working of the Indian
Supreme Court. Orienting the discussion on judicial activism through
an application of the Cohn-Kremnitzer model will allow us to make a
far greater sense of judicial decisions of India's Supreme Court. It
will also, as Cohn and Kremnitzer recognize, enable us to witness how
decisions may exhibit activism by some standards and restraint by
11. Margit Cohn & Mordechai Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism: A
Multidimensional Model, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 333, 336 (2005) (hereinafter, Cohn &
Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism).
[Vol. 32:1
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others.
This article proceeds in the following manner: Part II analyzes
the judicial activism discourse in the Indian Supreme Court by
examining the contributions of Upendra Baxi. It uses Professor Baxi
as the focal point of the narrative on judicial activism in India for a
range of reasons, but primarily because he can be credited with the
most detailed engagement with the meaning and purpose of judicial
activism put forth by an Indian scholar. Part III illustrates the
manner in which the Cohn-Kremnitzer model can be applied to
decisions of the Indian Supreme Court. It begins by studying the
Cohn-Kremnitzer model, its virtues and its shortcomings. It proceeds
to analyze three decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, two of which
have been regarded as instances of activism, and the third as an
instance of restraint. It attempts to illustrate how evaluating
decisions through the Cohn-Kremnitzer model reveals that their
activist quotient is different to what mainstream commentary on the
decisions suggests.
As Cohn and Kremnitzer themselves acknowledge, their model
is far from perfect.12 It gives rise to a range of methodological
concerns, most obviously the question as to the relative weight of
each parameter. Further, suggesting that the judiciary has a
participatory role in society may be controversial, and thus the second
category of the model may require modification, and perhaps even
elimination. Concerns similarly arise with respect to the third
function, which stipulates that the judiciary has a duty to preserve
certain constitutional goals. This paper does not attempt to provide a
rigorous critique of the Cohn-Kremnitzer model and outline a
framework for its modification. It also does not posit that the Cohn-
Kremnitzer model can respond to all the issues that are currently
being debated within the judicial activism controversy in India.
However, it does argue that understanding judicial decisions as Cohn
and Kremnitzer suggest can prove very useful for the present
narrative in India, and could be an important step towards a refined
debate in this area. The Cohn-Kremnitzer model does not hold the
promise of being able to provide all the right answers; it should,
however, enable us to begin asking the right questions.
12. Id. at 355.
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II. Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court:
The Discourse
In the United States, the term "judicial activism" holds an
important place within legal scholarship. 13 The term was often used
during the Lochner" era to describe the Court's approach towards
substantive due process. 5 The term was, and continues to be,
routinely employed in discussions on the Warren Court which is
regarded as "a fair shorthand for the peak period of extensive liberal
activism that broadened, extended, and nationalized civil liberties and
civil rights in America in midcentury.', 16 Recently, the term "judicial
activism" has acquired significance as commentators and scholars
debate the legacy of the Rehnquist Court, particularly with respect to
its decisions on federalism.7 Although perhaps not directly engaging
with the term "judicial activist", extensive academic commentary has
recently debated issues relating to judicial supremacy and judicial
review. 8 Despite the fact that scholars have discussed the issue of
13. For an outstanding analysis of the history, usage, and understanding of the
term "judicial activism" in the United States, see generally Keenan D. Kmiec, The
Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004)
(hereinafter, Kmiec, Judicial Activism).
14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987)
(noting the general impression that the decision in Lochner was wrong because it was
judicial activism and an illegitimate exercise of power by courts).
16. FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE
ENDURANCE OF THE WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 2 (1999); see
also Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why it
Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 257 (2008) (noting that "in academia and in politics,
the Warren Court is still synonymous with judicial activism"). Zietlow discusses, in
contrast with the Warren Court's activist rulings on individual rights, its restraint
towards congressional power.
17. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002) (discussing how the Court's
federalism jurisprudence has lead to an expansion to judicial review and deviated
from several constitutional principles); E. Thomas Sullivan, Judicial Sovereignty: The
Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (2003); Peter J. Smith,
Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 906, 954 (2006) ("[T]he actual pattern of decisions suggests that the Court
has not yet succeeded in divorcing questions of federalism from questions of
underlying policy"); see also Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the
Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001); Calvin Massey,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002). For a study of the
differences in judicial activism between the Warren Court and the Rehnquist Court,
see generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
18. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
[Vol. 32:1
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judicial activism' 9 and recognized the importance of defining the term
accurately,20 the fact remains that "as the term has become more
commonplace, its meaning has become increasingly unclear."'"
This truth applies equally, if not with greater force, to the Indian
experience with the term "judicial activism." Although scholars have
used this term extensively and unhesitatingly to describe decisions of
the Indian Supreme Court, there is little clarity on what the term
means. This paper examines the judicial activism discourse in the
Indian Supreme Court by concentrating on Upendra Baxi's treatment
of this subject. To provide a brief introduction to readers unfamiliar
with Indian law, Upendra Baxi is amongst the most distinguished
Indian legal scholars to date and is acknowledged as "the leading
commentator on the modern Indian Constitution."22 Currently at the
University of Warwick, Baxi has held several key posts within Indian
academia, including Vice-Chancellor of the University of Delhi, and
Honorary Director (Research) of the Indian Law Institute.23 Over
the past two decades, Baxi has provided a keen insight into the
working of the Indian Supreme Court, and has played an important
part in ensuring that Indian legal academia engages with the law in an
COURTS (1999); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); KEITH WHITTINGTON,
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2007); Jamal Greene, Giving the
Constitution to the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 886 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core
of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008).
19. See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L.
REV. 385, 389 (1969) ("Judicial activism can be and indeed has been negative,
defeating the governing process, as well as positive and creative."); Greg Jones,
Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141 (2001-2002); see generally Steven
G. Calabresi, The Congressional Roots of Judicial Activism, 20 J.L. & POL. 577 (2004)
(arguing that rather than judicial activism being counter-majoritarian, Congress
allows courts to indulge in judicial activism so that it can make policies which it either
supports or is unwilling to stop) (hereinafter, Calabresi, Judicial Activism).
20. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Judicial Activism: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 21 MISS. C. L. REV. 253, 264 (2002) ("[I]f we're going to have useful discussions
of judicial activism, we should define the phenomenon objectively.").
21. Kmiec, Judicial Activism, supra note 13, at 1443 (noting "[t]his is so because
"judicial activism" is defined in a number of disparate, even contradictory, ways;
scholars and judges recognize this problem, and yet persist in speaking about the
concept without defining it. Thus, the problem continues unabated: people talk past
one another, using the same language to convey very different concepts.").
22. Burt Neuborne, Constitutional Court Profile: The Supreme Court of India, 1
INT'L J. CONST. L. 476, 477 n.2 (2003).
23. The University of Warwick's Law, Social Justice and Global Development
Electronic Law Journal Website, Professor Upendra Baxi: Bio-Data, http://www2.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007llbaxibiodata (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
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interdisciplinary fashion. Baxi has made valuable contributions in
public law and socio-legal studies, and much of his recent work has
focused on the nature and future of human rights. 24 Baxi has also
21played a key role as a social activist and a legal reformer in India,
and is particularly renowned for his work in support of the victims of
the Bhopal gas tragedy.26 In a recent article dealing with comparative
constitutionalism, Ronald Dworkin noted:
I very much admire Upendra Baxi's erudition - his learning ranges
from the intricacies of Lockean scholarship to the subtleties of
contemporary and post-modern literary theory - but even more the
skill with which he integrates this learning with a deep knowledge
of the constitutional traditions of so many countries including his
own .... He makes it plain how much an American constitutional
scholar may learn from the history of Indian constitutional
jurisprudence and development, in particular. His own work shows
not only how careful and detailed a useful comparative
constitutional jurisprudence must be, but also how profitable it can
be.
27
In addition to fact that Baxi's works have played a pivotal role in
shaping our understanding of the Indian Supreme Court, a major
reason why this paper has opted to focus on his contributions is
because he is one of the very few Indian constitutional scholars, in
fact perhaps the only one, who can be credited with undertaking a
rigorous engagement with the term "judicial activism." Although, as
we shall see, his discourse on judicial activism is beset with certain
imperfections, his extensive writings on the subject serve as an
excellent point of reference.
24. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd ed.
2006); UPENDRA BAXI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A POSTHUMAN WORLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS
(2007).
25. See William Twining, Human Rights: Southern Voices Francis Deng,
Abdullahi An-Na'im, Yash Ghai and Upendra Baxi, LAW, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ELECTRONIC LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 2007,
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2007-1/twining/#a5 (last visited Nov.
11, 2008) (describing Baxi as "a pioneer in the development of social action
litigation").
26. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, MASS TORTS, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000).
27. Ronald Dworkin, Response to Overseas Commentators, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L.
651, 655 (2003). Dworkin's article was a response to Baxi's criticism that Dworkin's
theories do not sufficiently consider the postcolonial constitutional experience of
several nations including India. See generally Upendra Baxi, "A Known But an
Indifference Judge": Situating Ronald Dworkin in Contemporary Indian
Jurisprudence, 1 INT'LJ. CONST. 557 (2003).
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Baxi's detailed treatment of judicial activism begins in the early
1980s, in two books that provided incisive critiques on judicial
behavior in the Indian Supreme Court. 28 Baxi, even as early as 1980,
does not concentrate on traditional debates concerned with judicial
activism. He acknowledges that "the debate on judicial activism has
centered on the issue whether judges do or do not make 'law' or
ought or ought not to make law." However, he dismisses this
question, almost suggesting its irrelevance, and quickly concludes that
"the plain fact is that appellate judges make law, and not merely
interpret it."2 9 Baxi's concern seems slightly different at this stage.
Rather than devoting himself to the descriptive and prescriptive
questions of whether judges do and should make law, Baxi already
had his answer on these issues. He was more interested in "what kind
of law, how much of it, in what manner, within which self-imposed
limits and to what willed results and with what tolerable accumulation
of unintended results, may judges make law?"30 Despite believing
that this is the question that the judicial activism discourse should
focus on, Baxi himself does not provide any framework through
which the question ought to be answered. He shifts his concern
instead to another important issue: What does activism mean? This
question, it must be noted, is similar to the question that was put forth
at the beginning of this article (i.e. what is judicial activism and how
can we measure it?). Baxi seems to suggest that there can be no
objective determination of whether or not a decision is an instance of
judicial activism: "Judges are evaluated as activists by various social
groups in terms of their interests, ideologies and values .... Quite
often, the label is attached to a judge who may herself not consider
herself as an activist."31 This view, at some level, conflicts with the
philosophy behind the Cohn-Kremnitzer model which attempts to do
exactly what Baxi believes cannot be done - arrive at an objective
assessment of judicial activism.
Notwithstanding his view that an objective assessment of judicial
activism is problematic, Baxi does provide a definition for an activist
judge: one that pays close attention to issues of governance and
28. UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS (1980)
(hereinafter, BAXI, Supreme Court and Politics); UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT
AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT IN THE EIGHTIES (1985)
(hereinafter, BAXI, Courage, Craft and Contention).
29. BAXI, Courage, Craft and Contention, supra note 28, at 2-3.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at7.
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political development. Thus, "an activist judge is a person who has
disappointed the expectations of the governing elite which put her in
the judgment seat."32 Baxi himself is well aware of the limitations of
this definition, recognizing that a non-activist judge may well produce
the same disappointment.3  To resolve this, Baxi enhances his
definition of activism and links it to the notion of power: "[a]ctivism is
that way of exercising judicial power which seeks fundamental re-
codification of power relations among the dominant institutions of
state, manned by members of the ruling class."' 4 This definition of
activism appears complex. Analyzed closely, for a decision to be
regarded as activist it must seek a fundamental alternation of the
power relations in society, whether or not it eventually ends up
achieving the same. Activism then, according to Baxi, has more to do
with what a decision intends to do (or seeks to do) rather than what it
actually does. Baxi seems to place the threshold for a decision to be
activist extremely high - a fundamental recodification of power
relations among dominant institutions of state. Consequently, Baxi's
definition is limited to those decisions that relate to issues of power
and social hierarchy. But could other decisions not be activist? For
example, Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar,35 which will
be subsequently examined, appears to be an activist decision despite
the fact that it results in no fundamental alteration of power relations
in society. Interestingly, Baxi's definition of activism has little to do
with how a judge interprets a particular legal provision per se, and
focuses instead on the intended result of particular legal
interpretation.
Several of the issues that Baxi deals with in relation to judicial
activism are those that are socio-political in nature. For example,
rather than merely asking whether judicial activism is a problem, Baxi
takes the issue a step further and delves into the subject of whom it is
likely to be a problem for.36 According to Baxi, it is a problem for the
"managers of the people" because judicial activism is an answer to
many of the problems of those who are managed. 7 Baxi's view, that
judicial activism is a problem for a certain elite in society, can perhaps
be traced to the fact that judicial activism in the 1980s in India arose
32. BAXI, Courage, Craft and Contention, supra note 28, at 8.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 10.
35. (2006) 1 S.C.C. 46 [hereinafter, Shaikh Salim].
36. BAXI, Courage, Craft and Contention, supra note 28, at 15.
37. Id.
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in response to the lawlessness of the state. Thus the activism that
took place during this period, could at a very general level, be
understood as existing for the benefit of the common man. Despite
this, Baxi does recognize that all instances where a decision has
benefitted the people need not have been an instance of judicial
activism, and the judge in question may not have been an activist
judge. For example, he concedes that Justice Khanna was not an
activist judge in terms of "militant use of judicial power in service of
fundamental rights" but nonetheless his dissent in the habeas corpus
case38 during India's infamous Emergency in the 1970s39 does stand
out from a human rights perspective. 40 This conclusion is important
because it shows that while all decisions that benefit the common man
may not be activist, no decision can be activist unless it benefits the
common man.
Baxi's appreciation of the liberal approach to human rights
demonstrated by the Indian Supreme Court in the late 1970s and
early 1980s is evidenced by his paper "Taking Suffering Seriously:
Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India" where he
professed that social action litigation had led to the Supreme Court of
India finally becoming "the Supreme Court for Indians., 4' Baxi was
referring to the relaxation of standing rules by the Indian Supreme
Court, which had declared the right of "every citizen, 42 and any
"member of the public acting bona fide"43 to approach the court in the
public interest. This form of representative litigation was, and
continues to be, referred to by most commentators as "public interest
litigation," although Baxi preferred the usage of the term "social
38. ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla, (1976) 2 S.C.C. 521; see GRANVILLE
AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
ExPERIENCE 334-43 (1999) (hereinafter AUSTIN, Democratic Constitution).
39. Between 1975-77, the Indian government declared a national emergency in
what is regarded as one of the darkest periods in India's political history, replete with
examples of human rights violations. For a further account of the emergency, see,
e.g., BIPAN CHANDRA, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: JP MOVEMENT AND THE
EMERGENCY (2003). For a more personal account of the then Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi during this period, see KATHERINE FRANK, INDIRA 371-414 (2001).
40. BAXI, Courage, Craft and Contention, supra note 28, at 7; BAXI, Supreme
Court and Politics, supra note 28, at 79-120.
41. Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the
Supreme Court of India, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF JUSTICE V.R. KRISHNA IYER 289 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter,
BAXI, Taking Suffering Seriously].
42. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 378, 383.
43. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 S.C.C. 161,187.
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action litigation." At this stage, Baxi's conception of social action
litigation was a romantic and optimistic one:
[T]o me the future of social action litigation looks bright. The
future of law in India is partly, but vitally, linked to the future of
social action litigation because through it great and unending
injustices and tyranny begin to hurt the national conscience and
prod at least one major institution of governance to take people's
miseries seriously."
This fondness towards judicial activism and social action
litigation continued in the early 1990s. In his paper "Judicial
Discourse: Dialectics of the Face and the Mask", Baxi noted that
judicial activism was "a struggle for the recovery of the Indian
Constitution" and that the judicial interventions had led to
accountability in governance. 5 Introducing public interest litigation
(or social action litigation) and passing a series of judgments that
spurred the creation of human rights jurisprudence in India, Baxi's
analysis of judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court must be
contextualized with respect to the Supreme Court's role and position
at the time. In positing views such as how judicial activism was a
problem for the "managers of the people" that sought to alter power
structures in society, and by dealing with issues such as governance
and accountability, Baxi's works are better understood as a reflection
of the Supreme Court in the late 1970s-1990s, rather than as a general
theory on judicial activism. While Baxi may have supported the
Supreme Court's decision to "take suffering seriously" by relaxing the
rules of locus standi and emphasizing individual rights, his later
writings demonstrate a radical shift from this position.
Baxi's paper "The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism:
Explorations in the Geographies of [In]justice," published at the turn
of the century, clarifies and articulates his position on judicial
activism. Baxi suggests here that the Supreme Court's activism of the
1980s and 1990s marked the dialectics not only of "euphoria," which
has been examined above, but also of "disenchantment as well as
constitutional chaos., 46 Baxi now appears to have tempered his initial
enthusiasm and accepts that "judicial activism is at once a peril and a
44. BAXI, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 41, at 306.
45. Upendra Baxi, Judicial Discourse: Dialectics of the Face and the Mask, 35 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 1, 12 (1993).
46. Upendra Baxi, The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the
Geographies of [Inljustice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS
GRASP AND REACH 157 (S.K. Verma et al. eds., 2000).
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promise," and that "if India... furnishes an exemplary archive of
judicial activism, it also provides extraordinary narratives of the
failure, as it were, of the adjudicatory nerve, in those very arenas
where activist adjudicatory power should be felt most at home. 47
This balanced view is followed by an interesting distinction that Baxi
puts forth between an "active" and an "activist" judge:
An active judge regards herself, as it were, as a trustee of state
regime power and authority. Accordingly, she usually defers to the
executive and legislature; shuns any appearance of policy-making;
supports patriarchy and other forms of social exclusion; and overall
promotes "stability" over "change." In contrast, an activist judge
regards herself as holding judicial power in fiduciary capacity for
civil and democratic rights of all peoples, especially the
disadvantaged, dispossessed, and the deprived. 4
This distinction appears to reinforce the view taken in Baxi's
earlier works, that activism on behalf of a judge is assessed according
to the issues he is concerned with (e.g., accountability in governance
and human rights) rather than with reference to the specific legal
issues involved, the rules in question, and the manner in which the
concerned judge interprets those rules. A judge could, potentially,
pass a decision that supports patriarchy and other forms of social
exclusion, and such a decision may well be activist if one chooses to
focus on how the canons of legal interpretation have been followed
by the concerned judge.
A further issue arises in decisions that may not fall into either of
the two categories provided by Baxi. For example, in Shaikh Salim
Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar,49 the issue related to whether
Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,0 was
mandatory or merely directory in nature. This provision deals with
the time period that a defendant has to file a written statement in his
defense. It allows for a period of thirty days from the date of service
47. Id. at 161.
48. Id. at 165.
49. Shaikh Salim, supra note 35.
50. Order 8, rule 1 of the India Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reads:
Written Statement - The defendant shall, within thirty days from the
date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his
defence [sic]: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written
statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file
the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons
to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days
from the date of service of summons.
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of summons to file the statement. In the event that the defendant is
unable to file the written statement within thirty days, he can file the
same at a later date "as may be specified by the court," but this date
"shall not be later than ninety days from the service of summons."
Despite what emerges from a literal interpretation of the provision
("shall not be later"), by applying the principles that an act of court
shall prejudice no man and that the law does not compel a man to do
what he cannot possibly perform, the Supreme Court of India held
that Order 8, Rule 1 was directory in nature. The Court held that the
provision does not take away the power of the court to take a written
statement on record even after ninety days, and that the provision
merely casts an obligation on the defendant to file his written
statement within the time provided for.5' In doing so, the Court
ignored precedents emphasizing the usage of the literal rule as the
primary rule of statutory interpretation unless the language of the
provision is contradictory, unclear or leads to an absurdity. 2
Undeniably, this case is one where Pasayat J. went beyond the basic
reading of the provision, which clearly impose a mandatory condition.
Was Pasayat J. being activist in this decision, or was he being merely
active? An examination into the characteristics provided by Baxi that
constitute these two categories reveals that Pasayat J. fits into neither
category, and thus Baxi's analysis does not demonstrate how judicial
behavior in cases such as Shaikh Salim Hafi Abdul Khayumsab ought
to be characterized.
In his most recent writing on judicial activism (published as a
preface to S.P. Sathe's, Judicial Activism in India),53 Baxi draws a
distinction between different types of judicial activism in India. The
two types of activism, which he discusses in detail, and are examined
in Sathe's book, are "reactionary" activism and "progressive"
activism.54 Reactionary judicial activism is associated with instances
of activism where the judiciary reacts to particular political and social
51. This case seems to be a remarkably apt example of Ronald Dworkin's
discussion on how judges go beyond rules and make use of principles in adjudication.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1977); see also generally
Scott J. Shapiro, The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
52. See, e.g., G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam and Others, (1972) 3 S.CC.
717 (holding that courts should depart from the plain meaning of words or a literal
construction only if the same results in a patent absurdity).
53. Upendra Baxi, Preface, in SATHE, Transgressing Borders, supra note 10
(hereinafter, Baxi, Preface).
54. Baxi, Preface, supra note 53, at xiii.
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situations. Thus, the Nehruvian era activism that dealt with issues
such as land reform and the right to property, and the pro-Emergency
activism in the 1970s are examples of this kind of activism.5
Progressive judicial activism alternatively, according to Baxi, is the
kind of judicial activism relating to social action litigation (or public
interest litigation). Interestingly, Baxi's comments in the preface to
Judicial Activism in India appear to have little faith in progressive
judicial activism, and thereby mark an important shift from his earlier
writings that seems to praise this kind of activism:
This book [Judicial Activism in India] illustrates how fragile as well
as fractured progressive activism is. It is so for many reasons
already stated here. It must so remain because most Indian
justices, like other constitutional classes have limited powers of
understanding social/human suffering, and limited stamina to take
it seriously. For the most part they remain willing to strike but
afraid to wound errant state plenipotentiaries."
Considering this view, the conclusion that forms is that social
action litigation and the Supreme Court's urge to play an active part
in Indian governance has not, for Baxi, lived up to the potential he
expected in the 1970s.57 Baxi acknowledges his initial support but
argues that even though he grandly described the movement, he was
aware of the "dynamics of disenchantment." Why has social action
litigation failed or progressive judicial activism not performed as one
may have hoped? This question is vital, and one hopes that Baxi will
provide a comprehensive answer. Unfortunately though, Baxi's
answer is more philosophical than legal: "Justices are human, all too
human. Their capacities for self-learning, individual as well as
institutional, fluctuate."5 8  Interestingly, Baxi focuses on the
limitations of judges as human beings rather than the limitations of
courts as institutional structures of a certain kind. Considering Baxi's
emphasis on socio-economic rights, it may well have been more
appropriate for him to focus on the latter. 9 Baxi seems to expect so
55. Id. at xiv.
56. Id. at xiv.
57. There are other types of activism as well, notes Baxi, such as "eclectic"
activism and "opportunistic" activism. However, he does not provide details of these
types of activism though he considers the latter is 'unworthy of mention' and the
former deals with judicial intervention at certain times and abstention in other times.
Id. at xiii.
58. Baxi, Preface, supra note 53, at xvii.
59. The institutional limitations of courts form an integral part of the debate
concerning the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. See generally Arun
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much from courts in terms of their ability to provide social justice,
that it begs the question how such a role can be practically
conceivable and theoretically justified.'
Baxi places considerable emphasis on whether judicial decisions
promote human rights and benefit the common man, and it is only in
such decisions that traces of activism are to be found. A shift is
revealed from his early writings which support and commend the
approach of the Indian Supreme Court to his later writings that
appear rooted in disappointment with the manner in which judicial
activism has in fact played out. Even though Baxi has contributed to
the judicial activism scholarship in India, there are certain questions
that remain insufficiently addressed. Importantly, Baxi provides no
general framework that enables us to understand which decisions
ought to be characterized as activist. Although certain parameters
are provided (whether the decision furthers individual rights or alters
social hierarchy), such parameters appear to focus too greatly on
narrow questions and invite certain criticisms. First, they provide no
assistance in assessing the activist content of private law cases. While
in certain private law cases they may be applied, their applicability
seems limited to public law cases. Second, even in public law
adjudication, there is no yardstick to judge when a decision is in fact
furthering the cause of human rights. Third, and perhaps most
significantly, Baxi's definition of activism does not consider the
manner in which a judge interprets the relevant legal provisions in
question, and only focuses on the decision's intent to play a socially
transformative role. Consequently, a decision that fails to follow both
precedent as well as the standard rules of statutory interpretation, but
Kumar Thiruvengadam, The Social Rights Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
India from a Comparative Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 264, 274 (K. Chockalingam & C. Raj Kumar eds.,
2007) (noting that arguments against socio-economic rights adjudication can be
divided into two dimensions: the legitimacy dimension and the institutional
dimension); see also E.C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-
Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 321, 321-22 (2007) (observing that "[i]t has historically been argued and
traditionally accepted that...Judges and courts... lack the political legitimacy and
institutional competence to decide" matters concerning socio-economic rights);
FREDMAN, Human Rights Transformed, supra note 5, at 92 (observing that enforcing
positive duties "is said to be beyond the institutional capabilities of a court").
60. As Gadbois seems to rightly point out, "[o]ne must seriously question
whether any constitutional court, in either institutional or personnel terms, is
adequate to the tasks Baxi would wish the Indian Court to perform." See G.
Gadbois, Book Review, 75 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 523, 524 (1981).
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does not promote human rights, will not be considered activist.
Certain limitations in Baxi's vision of judicial activism arise from his
rejection of the doctrine of separation of powers, and this limits the
universality of this theory. According to Baxi the theory of
separation of powers is a first world theory that cannot be
automatically replicated in the third world: "[w]hatever may be said
in the First World concerning this kind of lawmaking by judges... it
is clear that in almost all counties of the Third World such judicial
initiatives are both necessary and desirable .... ""
Nor can an effective framework to assess the activist nature of
decisions be found in the discourse presented by other notable Indian
legal scholars. S.P. Sathe, for example, provides amongst the most
comprehensive studies of judicial activism in India in recent times.
According to Sathe:
Judicial activism is not an aberration. It is an essential aspect of the
dynamics of a constitutional court. It is a counter-majoritarian
check on democracy. Judicial activism, however, does not mean
governance by the judiciary. Judicial activism must also function
within the limits of the judicial process. Within those limits, it
performs the function of stigmatizing, as well as legitimizing, the
actions of the other bodies of government - more often legitimizing
62than stigmatizing.
Yet, Sathe does provide any rigorous analysis of the meaning of
the term "judicial activism" and focuses more on its historical
development in independent India. In his book, Judicial Activism in
India, Sathe tackles a broad range of issues, from how initial judicial
activism was influenced by the political climate at the time (more
specifically, the Emergency during Indira Gandhi's time) to the
relationship between secularism and judicial activism. While Sathe
does evaluate issues such as the legitimacy of judicial activism, he
does not concern himself with any thorough analysis of how judicial
activism may be defined or measured. Thus, while the entire book is
devoted to studying judicial activism, none of it is spent examining
what activism means. It proceeds on the presumption that the term is
understood. It is clear however that like Baxi (at least the early
Baxi), Sathe is in support of the "larger role" that the judiciary has
61. Upendra Baxi, On the Shame of Not Being an Activist; Thoughts on Judicial
Activism, 11 INDIAN BAR REV. 259, 265 (1984).
62. SATHE, Judicial Activism, supra note 10, at 106.
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assumed in recent decades.63 Similarly, Sathe also links activism to
power relations and argues that positive judicial activism is that which
brings about social change.64 Another distinguished Indian scholar
Rajeev Dhavan also commends the role that the judiciary occupies in
India today: "[a]s India meets the challenge of a billion mutinies that
animate and plague its life every day, the judiciary is not just the
lesser evil but a crucial ingredient of the democratic process by which
India is governed."65  Dhavan, like Baxi and Sathe, also tackles a
broad range of issues on the working of the Indian Supreme Court.
He has made significant contributions to the discourse in several
public law areas such as the basic structure doctrine (through which
the Indian Supreme Court limited Parliament's power to amend the
Constitution),66 public interest litigation,67 the adjudication of human
rights in India,6 and even affirmative action for women in
Parliament. 69 Yet, Dhavan also does not engage in a meticulous
analysis of the meaning of judicial activism and the manner in which it
may be measured. Political commentators, who view the approach of
the Indian Supreme Court with concern and note that it has
"implications for democracy that are both positive and
problematic,"7 also do not delve into this issue. This gap in the
judicial activism discourse is curious, and it is difficult to divine its
reasons. One plausible explanation seems to be that scholars have
concerned themselves with much broader issues of judicial power and
the ability of courts to deliver social justice. It may be the case that
63. See generally S.P. Sathe, Supreme Court and NBA, 35 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
3990, 3994 (2000) (noting the Narmada decision was unfortunate as it demonstrated
that the Supreme Court had stepped back from its larger role) [hereinafter, Sathe,
NBA]. Although, Sathe argues, that unlike Baxi, he does not believe that the Indian
Supreme Court has become a "Supreme Court for Indians."
64. SATHE, Transgressing Borders, supra note 10, at 5-6. But note Sathe does
acknowledge that "whether it is positive or negative activism depends upon one's
own vision of social change." Id.
65. Rajeev Dhavan, Judges and the Indian Democracy: The Lesser Evil?, in
TRANSFORMING INDIA: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRACY 340 (F.R.
Frankel et al. eds., 2000).
66. See RAJEEV DHAVAN, SUPREME COURT AND PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY
(1976) (hereinafter, DHAVAN, Parliamentary Sovereignty).
67. See Rajeev Dhavan, Law as Struggle: Public Interest Litigation in India, 36 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 302 (1994).
68. See Rajeev Dhavan, Promises, Promises...: Human Rights in India, 39 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 149 (1997).
69. See Rajeev Dhavan, Reservations for Women: The Way Forward, 20 NAT'L L.
SCH. INDIA REV. 1 (2008).
70. METHA, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 70.
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the unique social, political and historical climate of India makes
discussions of social justice, poverty alleviation and development
more relevant. Unfortunately, however, a major consequence of this,
and of the limited engagement by Indian scholars with the term
"judicial activism," has meant that judicial decisions in India are
never perceived as activist in certain ways and restrained in others.
They are branded - often carelessly - one way or the other.
Il. The Cohn-Kremnitzer Model and the Indian Supreme
Court
Ronald Dworkin once remarked that "the courts are the capitals
of law's empire, and judges are its princes, not its seers and
prophets."7 It is difficult to understand, however, when judges may
be performing each of these roles. Often the answer turns on one's
preferences and prejudices, i.e., the actions of a judge are criticized
because one doesn't agree with them, and not so much because the
judge ought to have acted differently. The above part demonstrated
how the current discourse on judicial activism in the Indian Supreme
Court has not been particularly instructive on what judicial activism is
and how we can measure it. If we are to arrive at a greater
understanding of judicial behavior, we need a mechanism that would
enable us to do so.
A. The Cohn-Kremnitzer Model of Judicial Activism
The Cohn-Kremnitzer model is an attempt to provide us with the
tools to understand the activist quotient of judicial decisions.
Although few scholars have examined this issue in detail, there have
been prior attempts similar to the one undertaken by Cohn and
Kremnitzer. Amongst the most notable of these, and one that Cohn
and Kremnitzer build on, is the model put forth by Bradley Canon."
Canon sets forth a variety of factors necessary to understand judicial
activism, in addition to the commonly used factor - majoritarianism.
Cohn and Kremnitzer's model is an impressive development on
Canon's model, and central to it is the belief that activism is a
function of several factors, each of which require individual
assessment and due consideration. Cohn and Kremnitzer develop
71. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 407 (1986).
72. See B.C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M.
Lamb eds., 1982).
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seventeen parameters, which they believe merit reflection in order to
arrive at the activist quotient of a decision. These seventeen factors
are divided into three categories, depending on their relationship with
the three functions that Cohn and Kremnitzer suggest constitutional
adjudication performs.73 The first of these is fairly uncontroversial,
and is the function traditionally regarded as being the primary
objective of the judiciary: the resolution of disputes.
Under this first category, the Cohn-Kremnitzer model populates
a list of twelve parameters. The first of these is "judicial stability"
which is measured by the extent to which a decision deviates from the
previous legal position. This parameter, hence, incorporates the
common law doctrine of precedent, and decisions that diverge from
precedent are regarded as more activist as compared with those that
stay true to the established legal position. The second parameter
under this category is "interpretation." Decisions that conform to the
original intent or literal linguistic meaning of a provision are regarded
as less activist than those that adopt a purposive interpretation.
Despite the supporting literature in favor of originalism and
textualism,74 whether or not it is the ideal model of constitutional
interpretation remains a matter of significant debate. For example,
according to Strauss, "The common law approach restrains judges
more effectively, is more justifiable in abstract terms than textualism
or originalism, and provides a far better account of our practices." 5
The Cohn-Kremnitzer model rightly refrains from delving into this
issue. It makes no judgment on whether judges should employ
textualism or originalism, and on which model of constitutional law
interpretation is the most desirable. It merely suggests that judges
who place less reliance on a purposive interpretation are to be
regarded as less activist, and leaves the merits of a purposive
interpretation for another debate.
The next six headings under this category cover a broad range of
issues, each of which represents an uncontroversial and commonly
adopted yardstick from which to assess activism. Under
73. Cohn & Kremnitzer, JudicialActivism, supra note 11, at 340-53.
74. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997); see also generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1999).
75. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 879 (1996).
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"majoritarianism and autonomy," courts that impede the democratic
process (for example, by interfering with policy or providing alternate
solutions to those of the government) are regarded as more activist as
compared with those than defer to the legislature or executive.
Again, Cohn and Kremnitzer pass no judgment on whether this is
desired; the model merely measures. Next, the parameter "judicial
reasoning: process/substance" analyzes whether a decision relies more
on strict grounds of procedure, or on "open-ended" (and perhaps
vague) grounds of substance. The former results in a lower degree of
activism as compared with the latter. The next heading "'threshold'
activism" looks at whether courts are prepared to relax rules on
standing, delays, justiciability, and so on (thereby also assessing
reliance on strict procedure). Cohn and Kremnitzer point out that,
more than in the case of other parameters in the model, the
assessment in this case is likely to turn greatly on the subject matter
of the case. Hence, if the court relaxes such standards, particularly in
a controversial or sensitive matter, it will exhibit a high degree of
activism. Thus, the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Shaikh
Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab,76 examined previously, demonstrated
"threshold activism" by the Court's willingness to relax the law on
delays. It should be noted that one is not entirely certain as the
extent to which the activist quotient would vary depending on the
sensitive nature of the decision, the threshold activism being constant.
Our next parameter "judicial remit" regards decisions that increase
the scope of judicial review as activist. Under the headings "rhetoric"
and "obiter dicta," decisions that exhibit extralegal rhetoric and
pronounce views on issues beyond the specific question of case are as
highly activist.
The ninth parameter under the first category of the Cohn-
Kremnitzer model is the "reliance on comparative sources." Cohn
and Kremnitzer regard decisions that rely on foreign law to be more
activist than those that rely on domestic law. This conclusion is
interesting, and unfortunately Cohn and Kremnitzer do not provide a
detailed account for its reasons. The usage of foreign law by
constitutional courts has become an important facet of public law
adjudication, and has sparked a great deal of debate." As a result of a
76. Shaikh Salim, (2006) 1 S.C.C. 46.
77. See generally Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review,
28 YALE J. INT'L. L. 409 (2003) (examining the borrowing of judicial doctrines
between Canada and the United States); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of
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wide range of foreign sources available, courts can often buttress their
arguments by the reliance on foreign law notwithstanding the nature
of their argument. Further, because foreign sources are not binding,
their reliance may take place in an undisciplined manner.7 ' Two
recent examples from the Indian constitutional experience are
illustrative. In Anuj Garg v. Hostel Association of India,79 the Indian
Supreme Court borrowed strict scrutiny from American
constitutional law holding that "protective discrimination"
legislations must be assessed with reference to whether interferences
with personal freedom are (a) justified in principle, and (b)
appropriate in measure.8° In A.K. Thakur v. Union of India,'
however, a decision only a few months after Anuj Garg, the Indian
Supreme Court refused to apply this test, noting that this American
constitutional doctrine found no place within Indian law.2 The Cohn-
Kremnitzer model would argue that A.K. Thakur is a less activist than
Anuj Garg because it refused to incorporate a foreign legal principle
and relied on domestic law. However, because of the problems with
comparative reliance discussed above, in certain cases courts may use
comparative sources to support professed judicial restraint is cases
where the domestic law provides unclear or contradictory answers.
For example, in the recent case of Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf
Club v. Chander Hass, the Indian Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of judicial restraint and relied on several foreign
authorities to outline the limited role of the judiciary in democratic
Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006); Cheryl
Saunders, Comparative Constitutional Law in Courts: Is There a Problem, in
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 91 (Jane Holder & Colm O'Conner eds., 2007)
(suggesting that greater engagement is required with the methodology that courts
must adopt while relying on foreign sources); Robert Reed, Foreign Precedent and
Judicial Reasoning: The American Debate and the British Practice, 124 L. Q. REV. 253
(2008) (examining the practice of British courts relying on foreign domestic law).
78. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[tio invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking and
ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry").
79. (2008) 3 S.C.C. 1.
80. Id. IT[ 48, 50.
81. 2008 S.C.A.L.E. 1.
82. See Sudhir Krishnaswamy & Madhav Khosla, Reading AK Thakur vs. Union
of India: Legal Effect and Significance, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 53, 59 (2008)
(discussing problems with the Court's rationale in rejecting the strict scrutiny test).
For a detailed analysis of the decisions in Anuj Garg and A.K. Thakur, see generally
Tarunabh Khaitan, Beyond Reasonableness - A Rigorous Standard of Review for
Article 15 Infringement, 50 J. INDIAN L. INST. 177 (2008).
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societies. 3 In this scenario, was the reliance on foreign law in Aravali
Golf Club an act of judicial restraint or judicial activism? "Reliance
on comparative sources" is a vital element to constitutional
adjudication, and is necessary to consider when one debates the
activist quotient of decisions. However, because of its wide
availability and non-binding nature, comparative sources give courts
the power to rely on them inconsistently and often to support any
point of view. Perhaps the reliance on comparative sources ought to
be judged by a greater examination of the nature of sources that are
relied upon. This may serve to accurately assess judicial behavior as
compared with a strict determination that the reliance on foreign law
is more activist than the reliance on domestic law.
The next three headings in the first category of the Cohn-
Kremnitzer model are "judicial voices," "extent of decision," and
"legal background." The first, "judicial voices," relates to the extent
of concurring opinions, and the greater the concurrence between
judges, the lower the activism. The second, "extent of decision,"
deals with the impact of the decision. If the decision is meant to
apply strictly to a narrow set of scenarios, the decision would be less
activist as compared with one which has a wide application. Finally,
"legal background" examines the legal provisions that are at issue in
the case. It studies whether the provisions are clear and
unambiguous, or whether they are vague and deficient. In cases
where rules are insufficient, courts will need to be imaginative and
adopt other canons of interpretation, thereby illustrating a high
degree of activism. An analysis of the relevant legal provisions in a
particular decision is central to determining whether or not the
decision is activist.
These twelve parameters provide a comprehensive guide to
assessing judicial activism when the judiciary performs its function of
dispute resolution. However, it is trite to state that the judicial role is
not limited to exercising this function; in public law adjudication,
constitutional courts have a much larger role to play. ' As Professor
83. 2007 S.C.A.L.E 1. The decision in Aravali Golf Club has been one of several
recent decisions where the Indian Supreme Court has emphasized judicial restraint,
particularly with respect to public interest litigation. For more on the India Supreme
Court's recent approach, see Madhav Khosla, Bitter PIL, INDIAN EXPRESS, Nov. 18,
2008 available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/bitter-pi/386940/1 (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008).
84. See, e.g., INDIAN CONST. art. 131("[S]ubject to the provisions of this
Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have
original jurisdiction in any dispute - (a) between the Government of Indian and one
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Chayes once noted, "the dominating characteristic of modern federal
litigation is that lawsuits do not arise out of disputes between private
parties about private rights. Instead, the object of litigation is the
vindication of constitutional or statutory policies" and may be termed
as "public law litigation... 5 Since the resolution of disputes cannot
account for all types of litigation, particularly "public law litigation,"
the Cohn-Kremnitzer model goes beyond dispute resolution and
delves into the issue of what other functions are performed by the
judicial branch. The second category described by Cohn and
Kremnitzer regards the judiciary as a player that "operates in the
public sphere as a participant in a network of actors, comprising other
government branches, individuals and civic bodies."8 6 As the authors
note, arguing that the judiciary serves a function as a party in a
constitutional dialogue with others branches of government means
that they "reject visions of the omnipotence of the third branch."87
The existence of this vision in the model is driven by the belief that it
is necessary to locate decisions in their social context. Evaluating
judicial decisions without reference to the reaction they receive has,
according to Cohn and Kremnitzer, two shortcomings: it regards
courts as the final word on a particular issue, and it does not account
for its role as a direct participant in a constitutional dialogue.i1
Professor Tushnet's recent discussions on "dialogic judicial review,""
as well as the emerging literature on experimentalist governance
systems,' are built on a vision of constitutional dialogue between
or more States; or (b) between the Government of India and any State or States or
one side and one or more States on the other; or (c) between two or more States, if
and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the
existence or extent of a legal right depends...") (emphasis added); INDIAN CONST. art.
132 ("[A]n appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final
order of a High Court... if the High Court certifies... that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution...") (emphasis
supplied). For a defense of this larger judicial role, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
85. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281,1284 (1976).
86. Cohn & Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism, supra note 11, at 335.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 343.
89. See generally Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205
(2008); see also generally Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of
Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895 (2004).
90. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
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different branches of government. The critical question for
consideration under this category is whether or not the decision finds
support in society, i.e., whether the views of the judges match the
views of the people. Thus, to use Cohn and Kremnitzer's illustration,
if a decision is regarded as a welcome change in society it would not
be regarded as activist, and if on the other hand, the same decision is
opposed by members of society and "other members of the
constitutional network,"9' a higher degree of activism would have to
be associated with the decision.
Under this second category, there are four parameters through
which the model suggests we measure judicial activism. The first of
these is the reaction of the legislature. If is legislature undertakes
measures to overturn the decision, then the decision is regarded to
possess a higher degree of activism as compared with legislative
affirmation of the decision. Often, there is no legislative response to
a particular decision. Such cases, as Cohn and Kremnitzer rightly
note, are likely to signify acceptance with the decision and should
thus be regarded as instances of a median degree of activism.2 The
next parameter under this vision of judicial activism assesses the
administrative or executive response to the decision, essentially by
examining its compliance. The greater the compliance, the less is the
degree of activism. Thirdly, the judicial reaction to the decision is
considered. One should note how in the previous category of the
model, a study was undertaken of the extent to which the decision
falls in line with previous decisions; the judicial reaction parameter
studies the extent to which future decisions fall in line with the
decision in question. The greater the affirmation of the decision in
subsequent cases, the less is the extent of activism. Finally, in
performing its function as a player in a constitutional dialogue, the
judiciary's decision is examined with reference to the public reaction
the decision receives. A high level of disapproval by civil society
forces will signify a high activist quotient, and similarly social
acceptance of the decision will mean that the decision should not be
REV. 1016 (2004); Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches
for the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 351 (2008).
91. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 90, at 336.
92. It is interesting to note here Calabresi's thesis is that contrary to being
counter-majoritarian, Congress permits and accepts the judiciary's indulgence in
judicial activism to allow it to frame policies which it tacitly supports. This also
supports the conclusion that the legislature is in favor of decisions to which it makes
no response. See Calabresi, Judicial Activism, supra note 19.
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viewed as activist.
The third function that a judiciary performs, according to Cohn
and Kremnitzer, is to protect core constitutional values - and
decisions that do so are not to be regarded as activist. The inclusion
of this function in the model rests on the assumption that "purely
value free judicial decision-making is not only impossible, but also
untenable."'93 Naturally, the question arises as to how such core
values are to be determined. It would seem that they are likely, in
most cases, to turn on one's interpretation, and perhaps even
preference. Cohn and Kremnitzer foresee this criticism, and argue
that while it may be valid in general, it is largely inapplicable to their
model. The reason being that Cohn and Kremnitzer limited their
scope to a narrow range of core values, which they believe "remain
uncontested in constitutional arenas." 9' Reflecting on the literature
that identifies core constitutional values, Cohn and Kremnitzer
unfortunately do not advance their own version of core values,
although they seem to endorse values such as equality, liberty, and
human dignity as being "core." One issue that appears to emerge
from this aspect of the model is scholars often disagree on the
conception of a core value. Even if there is a consensus on which
core values underlie legal systems, there may be disagreement on
what that particular core value means. In the case of equality, for
example, there are radically distinct positions on the meaning of
equality - and inequality.95 For example, one may imagine a case
where an affirmative action measure is under challenge. One judge
may uphold the measure, and another may strike it down, and both
may do so, in fact are likely to do so, in furtherance of protecting the
core value of equality. In this situation, one possible way to proceed
may be to treat a decision that protects core values as not activist,
irrespective of the conception of the core value it protects.
Therefore, the judge that upholds an affirmative action measure and
the judge that strikes it down will both not be regarded as activist if
both acted in order to protect the core value of equality. At any rate,
this brief discussion on the third function of the judiciary, and Cohn
93. Cohn & Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism, supra note 11, at 348.
94. Id. at 349.
95. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 12-30 (1992); AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 58-67 (2000); see generally Ronald DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000) (examining in
detail competing theories on equality such as the equality of welfare, the equality of
resources, the equality of capabilities, and so on).
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and Kremnitzer's own admission of many of the issues discussed here,
makes it clear that this particular aspect of the model requires much
greater debate and discussion. The same holds true for the inclusion
of the second function of the judiciary in the model, as there is by no
means consensus on the view that the judiciary must play a role as a
participant in a constitutional dialogue. In addition to these concerns,
there are others that arise with respect to the Cohn-Kremnitzer
model. The most apparent of these is the fact that since the
parameters do not have relative weights, it is uncertain which
parameters we ought to prioritize. Cohn and Kremnitzer, however,
acknowledge the existence of these methodological concerns,96 and
only attempt to provide a preliminary framework to refine the debate
on judicial activism - an aim which they readily achieve.
B. Applying the Cohn-Kremnitzer Model: Three Cases of the Indian
Supreme Court
In a further analysis of the Cohn-Kremnitzer model, Cohn
applies the model to the House of Lords decision in A v. Home
Secretary' thereby demonstrating how the theoretical framework
provided can be used to measure the activist quotient of decisions.9
This part proposes a similar analysis by applying the model to three
cases of the Indian Supreme Court: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India,99 that expanded the "right to life" jurisprudence in India;
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India,"° which upheld the
construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project; and I.R. Coelho v.
State of Tamil Nadu,1°1 which dealt with whether laws placed in the
Ninth Schedule to the Indian Constitution were subject to the basic
structure doctrine.
1. The Right to Life: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
During the drafting of India's Constitution, Sir B. N. Rau, the
Constitutional Advisor to the Drafting Committee was strongly
against the inclusion of the due process clause in the Indian
96. Cohn & Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism, supra note 11, at 355.
97. [2005] 2 A.C. 68.
98. Margit Cohn, Judicial Activism in the House of Lords: A Composite
Constitutionalist Approach, 1 PUB. L. 95 (2007).
99. (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248 [hereinafter, Maneka].
100. (2000) 10 S.C.C. 664 [hereinafter, Narmada].
101. (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1 [hereinafter, Coelho].
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Constitution.11 2  He held consultations with several notable legal
experts, including Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States
Supreme Court who expressed his view that the due process clause
was both undemocratic and burdensome to the judiciary0 3  In
December of 1948, a debate ensued in India's Constituent Assembly
regarding a proposed amendment that would replace the "procedure
established by law" clause in Article 21 of the current Constitution
with the "due process" clause.'O' While some felt that the legislature
ought to be trusted not to make laws that would infringe fundamental
rights, others felt that the judiciary must be given the authority to
question the laws passed by the legislature. Kazi Syed Karimuddin
felt warned if the clause "procedure established by law" existed it
could "do great mischief in a country which is the storm centre of
political parties and where discipline is unknown., 10 5  In contrast,
Alladi Ayyar pointed out that there was a great deal of inconsistency
surrounding the due process clause: "I would challenge any member
of the Bar with a deep knowledge of the cases in the United States
Supreme Court to say that there is anything like uniformity in regard
to the interpretation of 'due process." '1" 6 Others, like Dr. Ambedkar,
chose to refrain from taking a definitive stand on the issue."7
Eventually, unanimity was arrived at, and the Constituent Assembly
rejected all amendments which substituted the phrase "except
according to procedure established by law" for "due process of law,"
"save in accordance with law" and "except in accordance with law."
Dr. Ambedkar believed that introducing Article 22 into the
Constitution played a kind of balancing role, and it would "save a
great deal which had been lost""1 by the non-inclusion of the due
process clause. 109
102. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION 103 (1966).
103. Id.
104. See VII CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA DEBATES 843 (rev. ed. 1999)
[hereinafter, CAD].
105. Id.
106. Id. at 853.
107. Id. at 1000-01.
108. CAD, supra note 104, at 1497.
109. For a further analysis of the Constituent Assembly's rejection of due process,
see generally H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 970 (4th ed. 1993)
(discussing problems with the Constituent Assembly's reasoning in rejecting the due
process clause).
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In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,"' the Supreme Court
declined to read the "due process" clause into Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution."' This case dealt with a challenge to the Prevention of
Detention Act, 1950,12 on the ground, inter alia, that the statute
violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner relied heavily
on the United States Constitution, and sought to draw links between
Article 21 in the Indian Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments in the United States Constitution."3 It was further
contended that Article 21 must be interpreted to incorporate
principles of natural justice, such as an objective test and notice of
grounds of detention."4  The Supreme Court rejected these
contentions, with Kania, C.J. holding that there were four grounds on
which the relevant provisions in the Indian and United States
Constitution could be distinguished: (1) in the United States
Constitution the word "liberty" was used simpliciter while in India it
was restricted to personal liberty; (2) in the United States
Constitution the identical protection had been given to property,
whereas in the Indian Constitution the fundamental right to property
was contained in Article 31; (3) as the Constituent Assembly Debates
had revealed, the word "due" was deliberately omitted and the
expression "due process of law" intentionally found no place with
Article 21; (4) and finally, the word "established" was used and
limited to "procedure" in Article 21."' The Court highlighted the
express rejection of the due process clause by the Constituent
Assembly. Hence, "procedure established by law" was interpreted to
mean "procedure prescribed by the law of the State.""' 6 The Chief
Justice also did not accept the argument that Article 21 must
incorporate natural justice since the rules of natural justice, as regard
to procedure, were "nowhere defined, and.., the Constitution
cannot be read as laying down a vague standard.""' 7 Subsequent to
the decision in Gopalan, it was consistently held by the Supreme
110. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 [hereinafter, Gopalan].
111. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution reads: "Protection of life and personal
liberty - No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law."




116. Id. 121, 89.
117. Gopalan, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, T 21, 89.
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Court in several cases that the due process clause found no place in
India's constitutional jurisprudence.'18
This position of law underwent significant modification in
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. Maneka Gandhi dealt with the
procedure for impounding a passport under the Passports Act, 1967."19
The petitioner contended that no such procedure existed, and if even
it did, it was arbitrary and unreasonable thereby violating Article
21.120 Bhagwati, J. (speaking for Murtaza Fazal Ali, J., Untwalia, J.
and himself) held that the procedure prescribed by Article 21 could
not be one which was "arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive" rather it
"must answer the best of reasonableness" enshrined in the Article 14
(equal protection clause) of the Constitution. 121  Krishna Iyer, J.
concurred with this view holding that the procedure prescribed by
Article 21 had to be "fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate,
not to subvert, the substantive right itself, and that 'law' means a
reasonable law and not simply any enacted piece.' 2 2 Referring to the
dissenting judgment of Fazl Ali, J. in the Gopalan case, Krishna Iyer,
J. stated: "Fazl Ali, J. struck the chord which does accord with a just
procedural system where liberty is likely to be the victim. Maybe, the
learned Judge stretched it a little beyond the line but in essence his
norms claim my concurrence."' 13 Interestingly, the judges in Maneka
opted to not overrule Gopalan as they considered the conflicting
views in Gopalan to be merely observations.
24
The decision in Maneka has been critiqued on several grounds.
It has been highlighted how the Court's interpretation of Article 21
rendered Article 22(1) meaningless.25 In fact, Professor Tripathi
points out a remarkable anomaly: whereas aliens were not entitled to
the rights in Articles 22(1) and (2), they would be entitled to the far
118. See, eg., Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 106; Ram
Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 277; Maqbool Hussain v. State of
Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 325; Ram Chandra v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1629,
Satwant Singh v. A.P.O., New Delhi, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836; State of UP v. Shah
Mohammad, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1234; Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik .v State of AP, 1974
S.C.C. (Cri.) 803; Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 347.





124. Id. 6, 199.
125. K.M. Sharma, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer, (1981) 4
S.C.C. (Jour) 38, 41.
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broader range of rights in Article 21.126 Further, and more significant
for our present analysis, Maneka has acquired a legacy of being a
highly activist decision that went against the original intent of the
Constitutional framers.127 Post Maneka, the existence of the due
process clause in Article 21 has been repeatedly acknowledged, and
Article 21 has been'used to invoke a range of rights including the
right to a speedy trial,2 ' right to privacy, '29 right against delayed
execution, right against public hanging,"' right to decent
environment,3 2 and right to an open trial.133
Analyzing Maneka Gandhi by using the Cohn-Kremnitzer model
provides an opportunity to critically assess the overwhelming
narrative that regards the decision as activist. Under the first
category of the model, the initial parameter is judicial stability.
Accordingly, the decision is certainly one that exhibits high level of
activism since it departs from previous decisions. Previous decisions,
most notably A. K. Gopalan, had limited the scope of Article 21 to
procedural due process. A similar conclusion may be drawn from the
second parameter, since the decision contradicts the original intent of
the Constituent Assembly. As discussed earlier, due process was
expressly rejected by the Constituent Assembly during the drafting of
Article 21, but has effectively been introduced into the Indian
Constitution post Maneka Gandhi.'3 4  Even the third parameter,
majoritianism, reveals a high level of activism since the decision, for
all practical purposes, introduced the due process clause into Article
126. P.K. Tripathi, The Fiasco of Overruling A. K. Gopalan, (1991) 3 S.C.C. (Jour)
1,7.
127. See, e.g., A.M. BHATrACHARJEE, EQUALITY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 155 (1997); DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 265 (13th ed. 2001) ("Article 21 has now come to be invoked
almost as a residuary right - to an extent undreamt of by the fathers of the
Constitution or by the Judges who gave it the initial gloss"); M.P. JAIN, INDIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1267 (5th ed. 2003); Justice B.N. Srikrishna, Skinning a Cat,
Sup. CT. CASES J. 3, 12 (2005) ("What the framers of the Constitution consciously
avoided, judicial activism has brought in by the back door.").
128. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360.
129. Govind v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1378.
130. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 361.
131. Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 467.
132. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630.
133. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admin.), (1988) 3 S.C.C. 609.
134. See T.R. Andhyarujina, The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme
Court, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 193 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000)
(examining how the due process clause has become a part of the Indian
Constitution).
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21. The decision was heavily grounded in substantive reasoning
rather than procedural grounds since it emphasized the importance of
liberty. It also disregarded several issues relating to justiciability and
significantly expanded the grounds for judicial review. This is
evidenced by the wide range of rights, particularly socio-economic
rights, which have been enforced through Article 21 after Maneka
Gandhi. The decision also referred to a range of comparative
sources. In light of these features of the decision, the parameters
dealing with "judicial reasoning," "threshold activism," "judicial
remit," and "comparative sources" all suggest that that decision was
highly activist. In the analysis of judicial opinions, while multiple
opinions, including concurring opinions, are regarded as highly
activist, a unanimous verdict implies low activism. In the case of
Maneka Gandhi, while there were multiple opinions, Bhagwati, J.,
whose opinion forms the definitive part of the judgment, spoke for
three out of seven judges (including himself). In this context, it
probably seems best to regard Maneka Gandhi as exhibiting a median
degree of activism with respect to this parameter. The decision has
application to a broad range of rights and so must be regarded as
activist under parameter eleven. The legal background to the
decision is Article 21, which seems to be a well-defined and complete
provision. Thus, under the final parameter in the first category, a
decision dealing with such provisions is not to be regarded as activist.
An analysis of the above points to Maneka Gandhi being a highly
activist decision. It will now be useful to examine the remaining two
categories of the model to see if this conclusion is affirmed.
The decision was met by no hostility from either the legislature
or the executive. There have been no measures to overturn the
decision by other branches of government. As regards the judiciary,
the decision has been repeatedly affirmed and applied in a diverse
range of cases.135 The decision was also not met with public criticism.
Hence, there was broad consensus on the judiciary's decision in
Maneka Gandhi, meaning that the decision ought to be regarded
under this category as an instance of judicial restraint. The final
measure as per the Cohn-Kremnitzer model is the third category,
which evaluates whether the decision upholds core constitutional
values. The decision in Maneka Gandhi was driven by the belief that
it is not sufficient for Article 21 to merely enact a law as per the valid
legislative procedure; rather, the law must conform to standards of
135. Supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
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fairness and justice. A law that was arbitrary in substance, albeit
validly enacted, could not pass the test of Article 21. The approach,
undoubtedly, took into account the spirit of constitutional principles
that exist in order to put forth a liberal interpretation of Article 21.
Consequently, the decision had high value content most obviously in
its promotion of liberty. Hence, as per this parameter, the judiciary
was performing a proper exercise of its functions and could not be
understood as acting in an activist fashion.
This discussion of Maneka Gandhi reveals that while, as the
commentary on the decision argues, there are several characteristics
of the decision that lead one to believe that the decision was highly
activist, there are also sufficient reasons for believing otherwise. This
conclusion has been made possible because using the Cohn-
Kremnitzer model enabled the consideration of factors (such as those
in the second category), which had hitherto been unexplored. Since
the relative weight of the parameters has not yet been formulated,
one cannot arrive at a single answer as to whether the decision was
activist or restrained. However, it does become clear that the activist
quotient in Maneka Gandhi is not as patently high as most have
argued.
2. The Construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project: Narmada
Bachao Andolan v. Union of India
The Narmada Dam Project has been one of the most
controversial and vociferously opposed development projects in the
history of independent India.136 The project is estimated to cost over
Rs. 40,000 crores (approximately 8,732 million dollars),'37 and displace
approximately 200,000 people. 138  The Sardar Sarovar Project
(hereinafter SSP) is the largest project involved in the construction of
a series of dams on the Narmada River in India. Initially funded by
the World Bank, the SSP met with stiff opposition from social
activists and non-governmental organizations. Consequently, the
World Bank established an Independent Review to scrutinize the
136. See RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI: THE HISTORY OF THE
WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY 621 (2007) (noting how the Narmada movement
was the "most celebrated of tribal assertions in the 1990s" and brought attention to
the India's government dismal record of the resettlement of persons displaced by
development projects) (hereinafter, GUHA, India After Gandhi).
137. Sanjay Sangvai, Narmada Displacement: Continuing Outrage, 37 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 2132,2134 (2002) (hereinafter, Sangvai, Narmada Displacement).
138. GUHA, India After Gandhi, supra note 136, at 612.
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project. The Independent Review concluded, inter alia, that the SSP
was flawed, and had failed to take into account environmental
considerations and displacement realities. 39 Consequently, the World
Bank withdrew from the project, although the Indian government
decided to proceed with the SSP. 14° Those against the construction of
the dam emphasized how dams lead to settlement on floodplains,
which greatly increase the severity of floods,'14' adversely impact the
hydrological cycle, 42 and almost always face serious problems in their
rehabilitation and resettlement procedures. 3 Attention was further
drawn to India's poor track record in rehabilitating persons displaced
by dams,'" and to the problems being experienced with the SSP
rehabilitation. 45  Further, it was pointed out that that the SSP is
fundamentally flawed, and would actually lead to consuming more
energy than it would in fact produce.'"
139. See generally BRADFORD MORSE ET AL., SARDAR SAROVAR: REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW (1992).
140. However, many important political leaders, such as the then President of
India, expressed concern over the project. See, e.g., K.R. Narayanan, Let Dams Not
Ruin the Lives of our Tribal Brothers and Sisters, 39 MAINSTREAM 7 (2001).
141. See PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF
LARGE DAMS 27 (1998) (hereinafter, MCCULLY, Silenced Rivers).
142. See VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION AND
PROFIT 63 (2002) (discussing how the Kabini project in Karnataka led to the
submergence of 6000 acres of land, and the displaced villages needed 30,000 acres of
primeval forests to be cleared for relocation; consequently, the local rainfall
decreased from 60 to 45 inches, and the life for a dam was greatly reduced as a result
of high siltation); see also generally Hiren Gohain, Big Dams, Big Floods: On
Predatory Development, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 19 (2008) (discussing the impact of
big dams on floods in Assan and Arunachal Pradesh).
143. W.M. ADAMS, GREEN DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY
IN THE THIRD WORLD 174-75 (1995) (discussing the array of issues that arise with
rehabilitation and resettlement ranging from limited resources to the lack of time
devoted to the framing of an effective rehabilitation and resettlement policy).
144. See, e.g., J. Bandyopadhyay, Dams and Development, 37 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
4108, 4110 (2002) (pointing out examples of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, where only
27.69 percent and 25.85 percent of persons displaced by dams have been
rehabilitated); see also generally Praful Bidwai, Vicious Verdict on Narmada, 38
MAINSTREAM 4 (2000) (noting how three-fourths of the persons that have been
displaced by the construction of dams in India have not been resettled).
145. See, e.g., E.G. Thukral, Big Dams and Displaced People: Introduction, in BIG
DAMS, DISPLACED PEOPLE 24 (E.G. Thukral ed., 1992) (discussing how the
rehabilitation in the SSP is leading to the purchase of land from absentee landlords,
and consequently the unemployment of laborers who have been engaged in the lands
for several years as those receiving the land are tilling it on their own); Sangvai,
Narmada Displacement, supra note 137 (stating that the Madhya Pradesh
government has started illegally distributing cash compensation).
146. See, e.g., Arundhati Roy, The Greater Common Good, in THE ALGEBRA OF
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On the other hand, supporters of the dam contended that the
construction of dams in India has reaped considerable rewards.'47
They further posited that the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme
of the Sardar Sarovar Dam project was "one of the best in the
world.' ' 48 In response to the argument that alternatives to the dam
exist,'4 9 supporters of the dam argued that water scarcity is a problem
of such magnitude that alternatives are insufficient to address the
enormity of the situation; they can, at best, supplement the dam.'5°
This backdrop to the SSP controversy serves as a useful introduction
to the social and political climate surrounding the project as the issue
came before the Indian Supreme Court.
Narmada Bachao Andolan (hereinafter NBA), the primary non-
governmental organization that was against the construction of the
SSP, raised a series of challenges before the Supreme Court. 5 ' These
included the contention that the environmental clearance given by
the government to the project in 1987 was without proper application
of mind, and that even if the dam must be constructed the height
should be reduced since rehabilitation as per the Narmada Water
Disputes Tribunal's award could otherwise not take place.' With
respect to the issues before it, the Court noted that contentions
relating to the ideal height of the dam and the environmental impact
could not be raised at this stage since the project had already
commenced and there had been a great deal of investment already
INFINITE JUSTICE 43,83 (2002); McCULLY, Silenced Rivers, supra note 141, at 155.
147. See, e.g., B.G. Verghese, A Poetic License, OUTLOOK, July 5, 1999, available
at http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19990705&fname=featuresl&sid=
1&pn=l (last visited Nov. 11, 2008)(discussing how the Bhakra Nangal Dam system
supplies 60 per cent of the water consumed in Delhi).
148. Vidyut Joshi, Rehabilitation in the Narmada Valley: Human Rights and
National Policy Issues, in THE DAM AND THE NATION 174 (Jean Dreze et al. eds.,
1997).
149. See generally, e.g., Gabriele Dietrich, Dams and People: Adivasi Land Rights,
35 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3379 (2000) (discussing a micro hydel project that was
launched in the Narmada valley); Mike Levien, Gujarat: Leaked White Paper on Dam
Alternatives, 38 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 5323 (2003) (discussing a leaked white paper of
the Gujarat government that reveals that several government officials have been
advocating the alternative water management techniques which have been put forth
by opponents of the dam).
150. See Manisha Verma, Narmada Dam: What Alternatives?, 39 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 510, 600 (2004).
151. Narmada, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 664, 1 42.
152. The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal had been established under the Inter-
State Water Disputes Act, 1956, to adjudicate the water dispute relating to the
Narmada River. Id. 14.
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undertaken in its execution. 55 Hence, the Court noted that its
primary concern was only whether relief and rehabilitation measures
were taking place, and if Article 21 of the tribal persons had
consequently been violated."'
Senior counsel Shanti Bhushan, appearing on behalf of the
petitioner, argued that the forcible displacement of tribals from their
land and sources of livelihood was in violation of their rights under
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution."' Rejecting this argument, the
Court held that the displacement of persons does not per se result in
the violation of their fundamental rights" 6  The appropriate test
according to the Court, to determine such violation, was to examine
the rehabilitation sites and compare them with the original
habitation."l 7  On the question of whether the SSP had been
comprehensively assessed by policy makers, the Court examined the
history of the project in detail and arrived at the conclusion that the
project had been duly considered by the government (i.e., there had
been application of mind).' The petitioner also raised several
arguments with respect to rehabilitation and resettlement. 59 For
example, it was argued that rehabilitation measures were only being
undertaken for persons submerged by the project and not others
affected by it.' 6° Attention was also drawn to how different states
were implementing dissimilar rehabilitation policies leading to
inconsistent measures being provided.16' Further, it was argued that
the 1995 Master Plan of Narmada Control Authority has grossly
underestimated the number of persons who would be displaced, and
that rehabilitation was not taking place as per the Tribunal's award.
In sum, the Court rejected the arguments of the petitioner
emphasizing that courts would refrain from entering into questions of
policy; it could not undertake the role of the government despite
153. Narmada, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 664, 46-50.
154. This argument concerning laches was rejected by Bharucha J. who wrote the
minority judgment in the decision. Bharucha J. noted that the process of relief and
rehabilitation was going on during the time that the writ petition was filed, and thus
the laches argument was not valid.




159. Id. 1$ 130-141.
160. Id. 135.
161. Narmada, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 664, 134.
162. Id. 91 134, 136.
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problems with the policy.1 63 It also highlighted that if a policy decision
was challenged, then the challenge must take place prior to the
execution of the project or else laches would apply."6 The Court
concluded that the construction of the dam would continue as per the
Tribunal's award.6 1 Since the Relief and Rehabilitation Subgroup
had cleared the construction of the dam up till the height of 90
meters, the Court held that this construction should be undertaken
immediately, and that further raising of the dam's height would take
place pari passu with relief and rehabilitation measures and clearance
from the Subgroup.166 Was Narmada Bachao Andolan an instance of
judicial activism or judicial restraint? Much of the majority judgment
underlines the importance of courts to restrain from entering into
questions of policy. Presumably, the Court believed that it was not
being activist. Analyzing the decision through the Cohn-Kremnitzer
model should serve useful in validating this claim.
On the question of "judicial stability," it is difficult to perfectly
characterize the decision as an instance of activism or restraint.
While on the one hand precedent suggests a broad and liberal
interpretation of Article 21 (although precedent has not been
perfectly uniform in this regard), on the other, the decision did not
lead to the creation of any new law. Hence, it seems best to regard
the decision as having a median tending towards low degree of
activism under this parameter. Similarly, the interpretation of Article
21 provided by the Court was a strict textual interpretation signifying
judicial restraint. The decision exhibited agreat deal of deference to
government policy and there was very limited judicial interference,
meaning that the decision ought to be regarded as highly restrained
under the third parameter "majoritarianism and autonomy" of the
model. The decision was ground in procedural reasoning, particularly
the Court's argument relating to the petitioner's delay in approaching
the Court. Therefore, this also illustrates judicial restraint as there
were limited substantive grounds for the Court's decision. There was
clear reliance on threshold barriers by the Court's decision. This is
demonstrated not only by the laches argument, but by the initial
reluctance of the Court to grant NBA standing.6 6 Hence, the




167. See FREDMAN, Human Rights Transformed, supra note 5, at 140.
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parameter "threshold activism" also points to judicial restraint.
There was no expansion of the grounds of judicial review, and in fact,
it is arguable that there was a regression in this regard. Also, the
decision relied purely on domestic law and did not place significant
reliance on comparative sources. Thus, even under the parameters
"judicial remit" and "comparative sources" the decision is highly
restrained. Applying the parameters "rhetoric," "obiter dicta,"
"extent of decision," and "legal background" to the decision suggests
a median degree of activism: The decision was long but did not have a
high-level of substance-value rhetoric, there was considerable but not
overwhelming obiter dicta, the decision had neither a broad nor a
narrow scope of application, and while the Constitutional provisions
before the Court were not complex, the Court was required to
examine several other legal provisions which were not defined in as
simple and complete a manner. Finally, while a three-judge bench of
the Indian Supreme Court delivered the decision, there was one
dissent."" Consequently, the decision would have to be regarded as
activist under the parameter "judicial voices" as it was not a
unanimous verdict.
Evaluating Narmada Bachao Andolan through the first part of
the Cohn-Kremnitzer model strongly suggests that the decision was
one of judicial restraint. Moving on the second part of the model,
neither the legislature nor judiciary reacted adversely to the decision,
similarly exhibiting judicial restraint. On the administrative front,
however, there has been a failure to implement the decision: The
executive is allegedly not increasing the height of the dam pari passu
with relief and rehabilitation measures as per the Court's directive.'69
If so, this points to judicial activism, as does the parameter "public
reaction" as the decision invited a great deal of criticism from civil
society. Finally, the decision gave minimal regard to the protection of
core constitutional values, in this case liberty. Hence, assessing the
value-content of the decision, the decision is to be regarded as activist
as the judiciary did not safeguard "thin values."
The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan was disapproved of
by many.170  To name but one, S. P. Sathe, the eminent Indian
168. Narmada, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 664, T1T 256-85.
169. See Gargi Parsai, Violation of Court Orders, THE HINDU, Mar. 25, 2006,
available at http://www.hindu.com/2006/03/25/stories/2006032518682100.htm.
170. See, e.g., Rajeev Dhavan, The Narmada Decision, 14 LEGAL NEWS & VIEWS
27 (2000) (discussing the absurdity of the Court's view that it was limited in its actions
because of the award of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal); L. C. JAIN, DAM V.
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constitutional scholar, criticized the decision as it seemed
"unfortunately to be suggesting [the Supreme Court's] withdrawal
from the larger role which it has assumed in recent decades.''.
Unlike the analysis of the decision in Maneka Gandhi, applying the
Cohn-Kremnitzer model confirms the restrained nature of the
decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan. It does, however, underline
the complexity in judicial decisions and serves in demonstrating that
even a decision as restrained as Narmada Bachao Andolan can be
activist by some parameters; something which the commentary on the
decision has ignored.
3. The Ninth Schedule Decision: I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil
Nadu
In the case of LC. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, the Indian
Supreme Court held that the Indian Parliament's power to amend the
Constitution was limited, and Parliament could not abridge or take
away any of the fundamental rights under the Constitution .172 The
Court however, applied the doctrine of "prospective overruling" to
hold that that the basic structure principle had only prospective
application and thus the impugned First, Fourth and Seventeenth
Amendments to the Indian Constitution were not struck down.'
73
Parliament reacted strongly to the decision in Golaknath, and passed
the Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971. 4 The
Amendment was intended to enable Parliament to have unlimited
powers to amend the Constitution and consequently nullify the
decision in Golaknath. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, as well
certain other constitutional amendments passed by Parliament, were
the subject of challenge in the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala,'75 widely regarded as perhaps the most important decision in
India's constitutional jurisprudence.6 While the Government of
DRINKING WATER: EXPLORING THE NARMADA JUDGMENT (2001); Mathew John,
Interpreting Narmada Judgment, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3030 (2001) (discussing how
the judgment also indicates the failure of other legal communities in India apart from
judiciary).
171. Sathe, NBA, supra note 63.
172. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
173. Id. 78.
174. AUSTIN, Democratic Constitution, supra note 38, at 243-47.
175. (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 [hereinafter, Bharati].
176. Austin, Democratic Constitution, supra note 38, at 258-77 (referring to the
Kesavananda Bharati decision as one that would "profoundly affect the country's
democratic process", and providing an excellent political and historical analysis of
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India relied heavily on the Diceyian belief of the supremacy of the
legislature in constitutional democracies to argue that Article 368 of
the Constitution placed no limits whatsoever on Parliament's power
of amendment, the Supreme Court held that Parliament's power
under Article 368 was limited and that no constitutional amendment
could damage or destroy the "basic structure" of the Constitution.177
The decision in Kesavananda Bharati attracted, and continues to
attract, sharp criticism. Commentators highlight the decision's anti-
majoritarian and undemocratic nature. 8 Despite this basic structure,
the doctrine has found support amongst others,"' and has been
applied in a wide range of cases that confirm its existence as an
independent standard of review in Indian constitutional
adjudication."
The case of L R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu arose as a result
how the decision was arrived at). For an analysis of the ratio in the decision, see P.K.
Tripathi, Kesavananda Bharati v. The State of Kerala: Who Wins?, (1974) 1 S.C.C.
(Jour) 3; see generally Upendra Baxi, The Constitutional Quicksands of Kesavananda
Bharati and the Twenty-fifth Amendment, (1974) 1 S.C.C. (Jour) 45; DHAVAN,
Parliamentary Sovereignty, supra note 66.
177. See Bharati, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225. Interestingly, Golaknath was overruled as it
had held that a constitutional amendment could never abrogate or take away a
fundamental right; Kesavananda Bharati held that the same may or may not result in
a violation of the basic structure doctrine.
178. See, e.g., P.K. Tripathi, Rule of Law, Democracy, and Frontiers of Judicial
Activism, 15 J. INDIAN L. INST. 17, 33 (1975); T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 10 (1992); Ramachandran,
Basic Structure Doctrine, supra note 2 (observing the anti-democratic nature of the
doctrine and discussing how it hinders constitutional reform).
179. See, e.g., Virendra Kumar, Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution: Doctrine
of Constitutionally Controlled Governance, 49 J. INDIAN L. INST. 365, 397 (2007)
(observing that the basic structure doctrine is the "single most factor that has made
the survival of our Constitution possible in its pristine form") (hereinafter, Kumar,
Basic Structure). See also Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of
Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the "Basic Structure," in INDIA'S LIVING
CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 179 (Zoya Hasan et al. eds.,
2002) (discussing how the judicial review of constitutional amendments need not
necessarily be anti-democratic).
180. See, e.g., Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (where
the Thirty-Ninth Amendment to the Indian Constitution was struck down as violating
the basic structure doctrine); Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789
(where clauses (4) and (5) that were inserted into Article 368 of the Indian
Constitution were similarly struck down); Waman Rao v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981
S.C. 271 (where the constitutionality of Articles 31-A and 31-C was upheld on the
basis of the basic structure doctrine); Kumar, Basic Structure, supra note 179
(observing that "what was initially propounded as a principle in Kesavananda Bharati
has now become, as a result of successive juristic developments.., an axiom or
definite doctrine with a reasonably clear resonance").
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of Article 31-B of the Indian Constitution.181 In sum, Article 31-B,
introduced by the First Amendment to the Indian Constitution,
allows laws placed by Parliament into the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution to be resistant from the challenge that they violate
fundamental rights. Article 31-B reads as follows:
Validation of certain Acts and Regulations - Without prejudice to
the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A, none of
the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any
of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to
have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or
provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding
any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the
contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the
power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend it, continue
in force.
Although Article 31-B was initially conceived to give effect to
statutes dealing with land reforms, in time it has served to protect a
vast range of legislative acts from judicial review."' Consequently, a
conflict arose because, as Professor Kumar notes, while Article 31-B
conferred on Parliament unlimited powers by excluding judicial
review when Parliament amended the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution, the basic structure doctrine meant that Parliament's
power of amendment was limited and that courts had the power to
control the exercise of the power through judicial review.183 The
resolution of this conflict was the subject of I. R. Coelho, as a nine-
judge bench of the Indian Supreme Court attempted to address the
applicability of the basic structure doctrine to Article 31-B of the
Constitution.' 8 The central question before the Court was whether,
after the date of the pronouncement of the basic structure doctrine
(4/24/1973), it was permissible for Parliament as per Article 31-B to
immunize legislations by inserting them into the Ninth Schedule, and,
if so, how this affected the power of judicial review."" The Court held
that the basic structure doctrine would apply to all constitutional
amendments, whether or not the amendment amends a particular
181. Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1.
182. The Seventy-Eighth Amendment to the Indian Constitution made the
number of legislations in the Ninth Schedule a sum total of 284.
183. Kumar, Basic Structure, supra note 179.
184. Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1, $ 5.
185. Id.
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provision of the Constitution, or inserts legislations into the Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution. 6 The Court said it would apply the
"direct impact and effect test" to determine violations of the
Constitution's basic structure.'7 The I. R. Coelho decision marked an
important doctrinal development of the Court's basic structure
jurisprudence, from its emphasis on the relationship between the
doctrine and fundamental rights to its clarification that it is basic
features that the doctrine protects and not so much individual
articles.' 8 It is important to note that the Court did not delve into the
constitutionality of Article 31-B in this case. The Court declined to
answer the question holding: "[b]e as it may, we will assume Article
31-B as valid. The validity of the 1st Amendment inserting in the
Constitution, Article 31-B is not in challenge before us." 89 The
constitutionality of the provision had been previously upheld in
Sankari Deo v. Union of India," though the decision was prior to the
pronouncement of the basic structure doctrine.
The I. R. Coelho was met with significant public attention. At an
already volatile moment in the relationship between Parliament and
the judiciary, the decision was regarded as yet another instance of
judicial activism." The decision was regarded as a noteworthy one,' 92
and while some highlighted how it had "reshaped Indian law"' 93 and
made India's Supreme Court "one of the most powerful courts in the
world and also one of the most unaccountable,"'94 others pointed out
that the decision was neither that significant nor surprising. 95 In
186. Id. 133.
187. Id. 150.
188. Kumar, Basic Structure, supra note 179, at 394-97.
189. Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1, T 79.
190. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458.
191. See, e.g., V. Venkatesan, Judicial Challenge, 24 FRONTLINE 5, 8 (Feb. 9, 2007)
("[Tihe nine-Judge Bench has clearly gone beyond its mandate...").
192. See, e.g., Pratap Bhanu Mehta, No More Dark Spaces, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan.
13, 2007, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/story/20738._.html.
193. Milan Dalal, India's New Constitutionalism: Two Cases that Have Reshaped
Indian Law, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 257 (2008).
194. Indira Jaising, Ninth Schedule: What the Supreme Court Judgment Means,
REDIFF, Jan. 11, 2007, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jan/llindira.htm.
195. See Subhash C. Kashyap, Ninth Schedule Can't Help: Evading Judicial
Scrutiny Not Possible, THE TRIBUNE, Jan. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070129/edit.htm#4 (last visited July 20, 2008)
(noting that the decision is "very largely a reiteration of the existing law as declared
by the Supreme Court in earlier cases"); A.G. Noorani, Ninth Schedule and the
Supreme Court, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 731, 734 (2007) ("The judgment is neither an
exercise of 'judicial activism,' as properly understood, nor a defeat for 'progressive'
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addition to political criticism being leveled against the Supreme
Court," the decision also lead to protests and heated reactions
amongst sections of the public.197 In this context, the I. R. Coelho
decision serves as a useful experiment for us to "measure" judicial
activism using the Cohn-Kremnitzer model.
Judicial stability, the first parameter to be examined, evaluates
whether the decision exhibits deference to the court's previous
decisions. In Coelho, the Court followed precedent and applied the
ratio in Kesavananda Bharati.198 The decision was a consequence of
their attempt to harmonize the interpretation of Article 31-B with the
ratio in Kesavananda Bharati. As Sabharwal C. J., who spoke for the
Court, noted: "Article 31-B cannot go beyond the limited amending
power contained in Article 368."' 99 Thus, the decision cannot be
considered as activist as per this parameter. On the question of
interpretation, the conflict between the basic structure doctrine and
Article 31-B meant that the Court was unable to follow a purely
textual reading of Article 31-B and give it a narrow interpretation,
thereby signaling a high degree of judicial activism. The Court's
decision was a definite limitation on Parliament's power to amend the
Ninth Schedule, and formally expanded the judiciary's power of
judicial review to legislations inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution. Consequently, the check on majoritarianism and the
expansion of judicial review both constitute a high degree of activism.
Further, a high degree of activism must also be associated with the
next two parameters as the decision has a broad scope of application
(all legislations inserted in the Ninth Schedule after 4/24/1973) and
contains a high level of substance value rhetoric. Similarly, the
decision is not grounded in process-based reasons, but rather in
substantive grounds, again exhibiting a high level of activism. On the
legislation. It is a statement of the obvious."). I too arrived at a similar conclusion on
a preliminary reading of the decision; see also Madhav Khosla, The Ninth Schedule
Decision: Time to Define the Constitution's Basic Structure, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
3203 (2007) ("[T]he decision naturally flows from the decision in Kesavananda
Bharati...").
196. See Pradeep Kaushal, Ninth Schedule: SC Crossing Boundary, JD(U) Chief
Tells PM, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 24, 2007, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/
story/21624.html.
197. See Jaya Menon, Ninth Schedule Verdict: Angry Reactions Across Tamil
Nadu, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 13, 2007, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/
story/20800.html.
198. See generally Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1, 150-151.
199. Id.
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other hand, the decision was made under a simple and complete set of
rules, as there was no ambiguity in Article 31-B. The decision was
based entirely on domestic law, was not influenced by any
comparative jurisprudence, and was unanimous. Hence, the final
three parameters under the first category of the Cohn-Kremnitzer
model all indicate a low degree of activism.
Despite political criticism of the decision, there have been no
legislative attempts to overturn the decision and thus the first
parameter of the next category in the Cohn-Kremnitzer model
signifies low activism, as does the parameter studying judicial input,
because the judiciary has not overruled the decision. As noted above,
the public response has been mixed and varied. While the decision
led to protests amongst sections of the public, such protests were
limited to those directly affected by the decision. Similarly, while
some dismiss claims that the decision was an instance of judicial
overreach, others emphasize its dangers. Finally, as the decision does
not hold any implications for the executive branch of government, the
administrative yardstick is found to be inapplicable in this case.
Hence, as regards the function to participate in a constitutional
dialogue, the judiciary's actions in L R. Coelho exhibit a low degree of
activism. An analysis of I. R. Coelho, and of the basic structure
doctrine in general, reveals that the doctrine is rooted in the belief
that some constitutional values are inalienable, values that cannot be
taken away even by Parliament. Hence, the third category of the
Cohn-Kremnitzer model finds remarkable applicability in L R.
Coelho since protecting the core values in the Constitution - its basic
structure - was the fundamental basis of the Court's decision. Since
the basic structure doctrine is founded on the principle that
Parliament has no power to abrogate certain features that are core
values within the Constitution, the decision in I. R. Coelho cannot be
regarded as activist as per this parameter.
As noted above, the I. R. Coelho decision was met with sharp
reactions from several quarters. Barring few commentators, protest
rallies and media commentary suggested that the decision was a
highly activist one.'l However, applying the Cohn-Kremnitzer to the
decision presents a very different picture; the decision has both
shades of activism and restraint, and if anything, the overall picture
leans more towards restraint.
200. Supra note 191, 193.
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IV: Conclusion
Since the Indian Supreme Court introduced public interest
litigation and began an era of socio-economic rights adjudication two
decades ago, the term "judicial activism" has repeatedly found its way
into evaluations of the Court's practice. Yet, no methodology has
emerged that allows us to do justice to the term and to the nature of
the Court's decision-making. Examining the judicial activism
discourse in the Indian Supreme Court, with reference to the
contributions of Upendra Baxi, has demonstrated the need for such a
methodology to exist. The Cohn-Kremnitzer model is an impressive
attempt at providing such a methodology. Central to a large part of
the argument in this paper, and to the Cohn-Kremnitzer model, is the
belief that judicial decisions are complex and that assessing the
existence, and extent, of judicial activism is a process that requires the
consideration of numerous factors. Applying the Cohn-Kremnitzer
model to the decisions in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Narmada
Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and L R. Coelho v. State of Tamil
Nadu indicates that the decisions are more multifaceted than the
commentary on the cases suggests. In particular, this paper
demonstrates that the Cohn-Kremnitzer model makes it possible to
experience how judges "can be activist in one respect and restrained
in another."20' This paper has modest aims. Neither does it propose
to conduct a detailed study of the judicial activism debate in the
Indian Supreme Court, nor does it suggest that the Cohn-Kremnitzer
model may end it. Yet, by analyzing the decisions in Maneka Gandhi,
Narmada Bachao Andolan and I.R. Coelho, it is clear that the model
enables one to move beyond the current impasse in the debates on
judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court. Through this, one may
hope to gain a deeper insight into judicial behavior in the Indian
Supreme Court, and understanding judicial behavior, as Judge
Richard Posner recently reminded us, "is a key to legal reform.,
22
201. Cohn & Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism, supra note 10, at 338.
202. RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 5 (2008).
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